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What percentage of the population has the disease X?
8% 10% 13%
(a) ELICIT: user’s prior 
beliefs Uncertainty Analogy Posterior visualization 
The survey data has about 2 times more 
information than your prior beliefs. In 
other words, your prior beliefs 
are 2 times more uncertain than the 
survey data. 
(b) PRESENT: Visualized data 
14% 16% 18%
(c) ADD: Bayesian assistance
17.5% 20% 22.5%
Predicting what you should 
believe now 
10% 12% 14%
(d) User’s posterior beliefs
relative to
(e) Bayesian normative 
posterior beliefs
Our study evaluates 
by comparing:
[Bayesian model]
Fig. 1. Using Bayesian inference to assist how data is shown to improve belief updating. (a): The viewer holds prior beliefs about
a parameter such as a disease rate in the population, which are elicited in the form of a probability distribution. (b): The user is
presented with an observed dataset estimating the rate, which conveys information about the likelihood function. (c): The observed
data is accompanied by Bayesian assistance techniques in the form of an uncertainty analogy or visualization of Bayesian posterior
predictions derived from their prior beliefs and a normative Bayesian model. (d): In our experiment, we elicit posterior beliefs and
use the deviation between these beliefs and (e) the normative beliefs to evaluate the two types of Bayesian assistance. The goal of
Bayesian assistance is to bring the user’s updated beliefs closer to (e).
Abstract— A Bayesian view of data interpretation suggests that a visualization user should update their existing beliefs about a pa-
rameter’s value in accordance with the amount of information about the parameter value captured by the new observations.Extending
recent work applying Bayesian models to understand and evaluate belief updating from visualizations, we show how the predictions
of Bayesian inference can be used to guide more rational belief updating. We design a Bayesian inference-assisted uncertainty
analogy that numerically relates uncertainty in observed data to the user’s subjective uncertainty, and a posterior visualization that
prescribes how a user should update their beliefs given their prior beliefs and the observed data. In a pre-registered experiment on
4,800 people, we find that when a newly observed data sample is relatively small (N=158), both techniques reliably improve people’s
Bayesian updating on average compared to the current best practice of visualizing uncertainty in the observed data. For large data
samples (N=5208), where people’s updated beliefs tend to deviate more strongly from the prescriptions of a Bayesian model, we find
evidence that the effectiveness of the two forms of Bayesian assistance may depend on people’s proclivity toward trusting the source
of the data. We discuss how our results provide insight into individual processes of belief updating and subjective uncertainty, and
how understanding these aspects of interpretation paves the way for more sophisticated interactive visualizations for analysis and
communication.
Index Terms—Bayesian cognition, Belief updating, Uncertainty visualization, Adaptive visualization.
1 INTRODUCTION
People look to data visualizations in the media, government, and sci-
ence to help them form beliefs about the world around them. However,
abundant research indicates that people often struggle to properly ac-
count for uncertainty in making judgments from data. For example,
many people overinterpret small samples [32, 57]. In other cases they
may underreact to data, misjudging how informative large samples
are [2] or failing to update their beliefs when a sample conflicts with
their pre-existing beliefs [16].
Cognitive errors like under- and overreaction to data can be de-
fined by comparing human judgments to Bayesian inference, a statis-
tical method that prescribes how to update probabilistic beliefs given
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new evidence. Imagine you are interested in a political candidate A’s
chance of winning an election, and you have some expectations about
that chance, based on, for example, seeing early results from a small
poll of registered voters, and your experiences talking to others in your
social circle. If asked to describe your beliefs, you’d say your best
guess of the candidate’s chance of winning the election is 51%, with
a 95% chance that the value will be between 47% and 55%. In a
Bayesian framework, these beliefs are called your prior beliefs.
One day you encounter a visualization of new poll results. The data
indicates that A has a 60% chance of winning, based on responses
from around 1000 people, with the chance of winning falling between
57% and 63% with high confidence (e.g., 95%). What should you
believe after encountering the second poll? The laws of Bayesian be-
lief updating prescribe an “optimal” way for combining prior and new
information. Assuming that you have no reason to distrust the new ev-
idence, you should update your beliefs proportional to the amount of
new information that the poll provides over what you already believed.
Bayesian inference formalizes this intuition through Bayes rule, which
states that your posterior beliefs about a parameter after observing new
data are proportional to your prior beliefs about the parameter multi-
plied by the information contained in the new evidence about the pa-
rameter. In this case, your new beliefs about A’s chance of winning
should be around 57%, with a 95% interval between 54% and 59%.
Recent work shows how a Bayesian cognition perspective can
deepen understanding of visualization interpretation [43, 65] and con-
tribute to more rigorous evaluation, in which deviation from Bayesian
updating is used as a proxy for understanding which visualizations
best support accurate perception of how informative data is [43]. We
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extend this work by considering the generative potential of predictions
from models of Bayesian inference to guide belief updating from visu-
alized data. We propose two Bayesian assistance techniques that use
the mathematical intuitions of Bayesian theory to guide a user’s belief
formation process as they interact with visualized data. Both tech-
niques treat the user’s subjective uncertainty about a parameter value
before seeing newly observed data (i.e., their prior distribution) as a
reference point against which the uncertainty in the observed data can
be compared (Fig. 1b2). An uncertainty analogy relates uncertainty
in observed data to uncertainty in the user’s prior. A posterior visu-
alization depicts the posterior beliefs predicted by Bayesian inference
given the user’s prior beliefs.
How does Bayesian assistance change users’ beliefs as they inter-
act with a visualization? We present a preregistered experiment with
4,800 participants in which we compare users’ belief updating under
Bayesian uncertainty analogies and posterior visualizations to beliefs
based on common presentations of uncertain estimates like point esti-
mates with reported sample size or a shaded interval displaying prob-
ability density. We find that:
• For small datasets (N=158), both techniques bring the average
user’s belief updating closer to normative Bayesian inference.
• Eliciting a prior from a user itself can encourage more Bayesian
updating, as evidenced through an aggregate analysis of people’s
updating without and without elicitation.
We conclude by discussing the implications of our results as well as
the adoption of Bayesian inference to guide visualization design and
evaluation.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Visually Communicating Uncertainty
Research in judgment and decision-making demonstrates how human
judgments under uncertainty can diverge from statistical accounts. For
example, belief in the law of small numbers describes how many peo-
ple are too confident in the representativeness of small samples [63].
More recent work describes how a related bias called non-belief in
the law of large numbers, in which a person simply believes that pro-
portions in any given sample might be determined by a rate different
than the true rate (i.e., misunderstands the relation between sample
size and error), is compatible with the earlier work on small samples
by Tverksy, Kahneman, and many others [12].
Some interventions can reduce biases in interpreting uncertainty.
Research in uncertainty visualization has proposed many techniques
for visually representing quantified uncertainty distribution to im-
prove judgments or decisions, from boxplots (e.g., [55]) to visualiza-
tions of probability density as area, shading or other visual properties
(e.g., [22, 27]) to frequency-based representations of probability like
hypothetical outcome plots and quantile dotplots [11, 26, 28, 35, 38,
39, 40] probabilistic animations. We compare how well users update
their beliefs using two Bayesian assistance relative to a conventional
interval and shaded density representation of a dataset.
2.2 Bayesian Inference in Judgments & Decisions
Empirical research in economics and mathematical cognition demon-
strates the role of beliefs in numerous judgments and decisions. Man-
ski [46] argues against a long standing bias in economics toward in-
ferring beliefs from choice, noting that eliciting probabilistic beliefs
provides useful and predictive insight into behavior. He surveys eco-
nomic literature on how people form beliefs and how these beliefs
influence their financial decision making [9, 4] or other consump-
tion [8, 25, 56, 3, 13, 18, 20, 30, 29, 66]. Camerer [17], Schotter
and Trevino [58] summarize the value of studying beliefs from labora-
tory findings, while Abeler et al. [1] use quantitative meta-analysis to
show that experiment subjects can generally be trusted to report honest
beliefs in economics experiments [1].
Mathematical psychologists have shown how Bayesian models of
cognition help explain a range of perceptual and cognitive phenom-
ena, such as inferring causal relationships [60, 59] or inductive learn-
ing [61, 34]. For example, Griffiths and Tenenbaum [34] demonstrate
that the aggregate posterior belief distribution across people approxi-
mates the normative Bayesian posterior over various “everyday quan-
tities” such as cake baking times and human lifespans.
Though the authors explicitly suggest that a mathematical account
would not be feasible, McCurdy et al.’s [47] suggestion that implicit
error captures how users “mentally adjust” data-driven estimates in
interpretation resembles the Bayesian ideal that prior beliefs influ-
ence inferences drawn from new data. In contrast to their assertion
that mathematical frameworks are not possible, we demonstrate how
Bayesian modeling can combine subjective beliefs with observed data
to reduce integration errors that may arse in mental approximation.
Until recently, research on the role of visualizations in promoting
Bayesian reasoning was limited to studying how visualizations affect
performance on classic conditional probability tasks like the mam-
mography problem [51, 54, 31, 62, 53, 33, 21]. However, several
recent visualization studies apply Bayesian modeling to visualization
interpretation [43, 65]. In the closest prior work, Kim et al. [43] pre-
sented people with survey estimates of several proportions, finding that
at an individual level, people’s posterior beliefs diverged considerably
from normative Bayesian. In aggregate, however, people’s posterior
beliefs closely approximated the predictions of normative Bayesian
inference for estimates based on small samples (N=158), but not for
those based on very large samples (N=750k). Kim et al. show how
the deviation between a person’s posterior beliefs and the Bayesian
normative posterior beliefs can be used as a proxy for a user’s uncer-
tainty comprehension. Our work extends this inquiry by considering
whether Bayesian inference can also be used to generate personalized
data presentations based on a user’s prior beliefs.
3 MOTIVATING BAYESIAN ASSISTANCE
We introduce the assumptions behind applying a Bayesian perspec-
tive to visualization interpretation, then the specific components of
our Bayesian modeling approach in the context of a belief updating
scenario.
3.1 Assumptions of a Bayesian Approach to Visualization
To apply Bayesian inference to visualization, we assume that prior to
interacting with a visualization, a user has some state of prior beliefs
about a parameter which the data provides an estimate of (e.g., a rate).
We assume that any user’s prior beliefs can be elicited through an inter-
active interface, and represented by a probability distribution. We can
think of how tightly concentrated this distribution is as the strength of
the user’s beliefs, capturing how confident they are in their knowledge
about the parameter value. The user’s prior beliefs about a parameter
can range from no relevant knowledge about the parameter value (e.g.,
a uniform distribution in which all values of the parameter are thought
to be equally likely) to near complete certainty (e.g., high confidence
that the value is within a very small interval).
We assume that the user will update their prior beliefs about the pa-
rameter upon viewing new information in a visualization. We assume
that the closer the user’s belief update is to optimally combining the
information in their prior with the new visualized data (as defined by a
standard Bayesian model of updating a sample proportion), the more
rationally they have updated their beliefs.
For example, if one has no reason to believe that any particular
value of the parameter is more likely than any other, their posterior
beliefs should be equal to the evidence that the visualized data pro-
vides about the parameter value. If they had very strong prior beliefs
about the parameter, and saw a relatively small amount of evidence in
the visualization, their posterior beliefs should remain close to even
identical to their prior beliefs.
To model this process we use mathematical formulations standard
in Bayesian statistics, including to fit the elicited beliefs to a statistical
(prior) distribution, to represent the information about the parameter
implied by the dataset (likelihood), and to calculate the Bayesian pos-
terior beliefs. We provide further mathematical details below.
Finally, note that Bayesian inference in cognition is typically as-
sumed to be the implicit process; our work explores whether making
predictions from normative Bayesian updating explicit can be ben-
eficial to users. Further, unless possible bias is intentionally mod-
eled, a Bayesian model of updating will assume that prior beliefs
and observed data are equally credible sources of information. Our
work demonstrates how people’s self-reported trust in data’s credibil-
ity helps predict where this assumption may not hold.
3.2 Applying Bayesian Inference to Visualization Scenario
Consider a scenario in which a user will be presented with a visualized
estimate of a parameter θ . Imagine that the parameter is the propor-
tion of residents of U.S. assisted living centers who have Alzheimer’s.
As a proportion, θ can theoretically take any value from 0 to 1. Be-
fore the user views observed data, they articulate their prior beliefs by
assigning probability over plausible values of θ using an interactive
interface (Fig 1a).
In Bayesian inference, beliefs take the form of a probability distri-
bution. For a proportion parameter θ , a Beta distribution is a conve-
nient distribution to capture beliefs. Two parameters sufficiently de-
fine a unique Beta distribution: Beta(α,β ). We can think of α−1 as
the number of successful events (e.g., the number of residents in as-
sisted living centers who are believed to have Alzheimer’s), and β −1
as the number of unsuccessful events (e.g., the number of residents in
assisted living centers who are believed to not have Alzheimer’s).
Imagine a user who guesses that approximately 10% of residents in
assisted living centers have Alzheimer’s, but with relatively high un-
certainty. Assume that the information their beliefs imply is equivalent
to having observed a sample of 10 assisted living center residents, one
of which had dementia. Their prior beliefs are captured by the distri-
bution Beta(2,10). The sum of the successful events and the failure
events (i.e., 10) represents the amount of information (or conversely
uncertainty) contained in the user’s prior distribution.
Imagine that the user is next presented with a visualization of an es-
timate captured by observed data (Fig 1 (b1)), such as the proportion
of assisted living center residents with dementia according to records
for a chain of centers with locations across the country. Out of 1,000
residents of these chains, 420 have dementia. We model the data gen-
erating process as a binomial process in which any individual indepen-
dently has the disease with a certain (identical) probability θ .
We represent the observed data as a likelihood function capturing
the probability of different values of θ given the observed data. Con-
veying a sense of likelihood is the goal of most approaches to commu-
nicating uncertainty in estimates. The likelihood encodes the relative
number of ways that different values of θ could produce the observed
proportion given our assumptions about the data generating process
and the size of the observed sample. The likelihood function for a
sample proportion, 42%, of 1,000 total residents can be represented
by Binomial(1000,0.42), implying an expected 420 successful events
and 580 failure events but with some uncertainty due to sampling error.
#o f successesposterior = #o f successesprior +#o f successesdata
#o f f ailuresposterior = #o f f ailuresprior +#o f f ailuresdata
(1)
The normative posterior distribution (Fig 1e) that predicts rational
updating is calculated by using Bayes rule to update the probability
of θ in the prior with the information about θ implied by the likeli-
hood function. Equation 1 results from using Bayes rule to estimate
the number of successful events and the failure events in the poste-
rior beliefs as a function of the estimates implied by the observed data
and prior. The number of successful and failure events in the poste-
rior beliefs is equivalent to a Beta distribution: Beta(422,590). In-
tuitively, under Bayesian inference the user’s belief distribution after
encountering the observed data shifts proportionally to the amount of
information contained in the two distributions.
3.3 Designing Bayesian Assistance
We propose two Bayesian assistance techniques that exploit the user’s
prior beliefs. An uncertainty analogy relates uncertainty in observed
data to uncertainty in the user’s prior, and a posterior visualization
depicts the posterior beliefs predicted by Bayesian inference, given
the user’s prior beliefs.
3.3.1 Uncertainty Analogy
The user’s prior distribution captures their uncertainty about the pa-
rameter value before seeing the observed data. We can treat this sub-
jective uncertainty as a personally meaningful reference against which
uncertainty in the observed data can be compared. Imagine you are
presented with a visualization and text telling you how much informa-
tion the visualized data contains relative to how informed you were
about the topic already: “Your prior beliefs have 2 times more infor-
mation than the data.”
To generate the multiplicative factor, we compare κ (a proxy for
sample size defined as α + β ) in the prior distribution (κprior) to the
sample size of the observed data (κdata). To avoid multipliers less than
one, we always chose the distribution (Beta corresponding to likeli-
hood or participant’s prior) for which κ was lower as the reference dis-
tribution. For example, if κdata is greater than κprior, we calculated the
multiplier as κdata/κprior (e.g., Your prior beliefs have 2 times more
information than the data), calculating the multiplier as κprior/κdata
in the case where κprior was greater.
3.3.2 Posterior Visualization
An even more direct way to guide a user toward Bayesian inference is
to present them with the normative belief distribution calculated using
their prior beliefs and the likelihood. Imagine that in addition to an ob-
served dataset, you are presented with a visualization suggesting how
you should update your beliefs, in the form of the normative posterior
calculated using your prior distribution, along with a brief explanation
of how it was derived (i.e., by combining the information in their prior
beliefs with that in the observed data).
4 EXPERIMENT: BAYESIAN ASSISTANCE
We designed and preregistered a large crowd-sourced between-
subjects experiment to evaluates how participants’ appear to update
their beliefs under Bayesian assistance versus more conventional de-
pictions of proportion estimates.
Prior elicitation Visualization Intervention 
Prior elicitation
Point Estimate
Uncertainty Visualization
Uncertainty Analogy
Posterior Visualization
No prior elicitation
Point Estimate
Uncertainty Visualization
Main study
Dementia dataset 
with small sample size
with large sample size
More trustworthy dataset 
Abortion dataset 
with small sample size
with large sample size
Less trustworthy dataset
Dataset Conditions
X
Fig. 2. The study conditions and datasets.
4.1 Study Conditions & Research Questions
We tested four approaches to conveying uncertainty (Fig. 2).
• Point Estimate (with sample size): Participants view a point esti-
mate of the observed proportion with the size of the sample in text.
• Uncertainty Visualization: Participants view a point estimate of the
observed proportion along with a probability density shaded interval
in which the estimate is expected to fall with high probability (95%).
• Uncertainty Analogy: Participants view the uncertainty visualiza-
tion alongside an uncertainty analogy. A brief explanation of how
the analogy was generated (e.g., “We directly compared the sample
size of the study to the sample size implied by your prior beliefs.”)
is also presented.
• Visualization: Participants view the uncertainty visualization
alongside a visualization of the normative posterior distribution. A
brief explanation of how the posterior was arrived at (including an
analogy expression comparing the uncertainty in the participant’s
prior beliefs to that of the data as above) is presented.
N=158 N=5028
Priors Priors
Normative 
posterior
Normative 
posterior
Likelihood
function
Likelihood
function
Fig. 3. Illustration of how normative posterior beliefs (dashed) are in-
fluenced by the sample size of the observed data (represented by the
likelihood in gray) given a prior distribution (solid). Assuming a relatively
weak prior, when the sample size is small, the normative posterior dis-
tribution is located between the likelihood and the prior. Assuming the
same prior and a large sample observed dataset, the normative poste-
rior distribution is nearly identical to the likelihood function.
4.1.1 Robustness to Varying Sample Size
As Fig. 3 left shows, a weak prior belief distribution still has a demon-
strable impact on the normative posterior beliefs when the observed
data is relatively small (N=158). For a larger sample (N=5208) the
normative posterior distribution is nearly identical to the observed data
(Fig. 3 right). By varying sample size, we use our experiment to in-
vestigate whether a tendency for people’s posterior beliefs to deviate
more substantially from the normative posterior distribution for large
samples found in prior work [43] holds for our participants as well.
We chose 158 (after Kim et al [43]) and 5,208 as samples in the low
thousands are common in presentations of poll or survey results that
people encounter in everyday life.
4.1.2 Robustness to Topic Controversy
Besides misunderstanding uncertainty, not trusting that a dataset is a
faithful depiction of reality is another possible reason for the deviation
between one’s posterior beliefs and the normative Bayesian posterior.
To investigate the impact of the perceived “controversialness” of
data on the effects of Bayesian assistance, we identified two datasets
that vary in how likely they are to be perceived as having been manip-
ulated. We recruited 200 Mechanical Turk workers in the U.S. with
approval ratings of 97% and above. Participants viewed pairwise com-
binations of six datasets: the proportion of 1) residents of U.S. assisted
living centers residents who have Alzheimer’s or other dementia, 2)
corn production relative to other grain production in the U.S., 3) pa-
tients in the U.S who misuse opioids prescribed for chronic pain, 4)
foreign-born residents in the U.S., 5) adults in the U.S who think third
trimester abortion should be illegal regardless of circumstances, and
6) adults in the U.S. who support the death penalty.
In a first session, on each trial the participant saw a pair of dataset
descriptions (i.e., a summary of the variable) side by side. Partici-
pants were asked to choose one dataset that “seems more likely to
be tampered with or manipulated to persuade” using a radio button.
Participants viewed a total of 15 pairs (trials). In the second session,
participants viewed the same 15 pairs but where the original propor-
tion from the source is presented with a 95% highest density interval
calculated by for an assumed sample size of 158. We randomized the
order of pairs in both sessions.
We ranked the datasets by perceived manipulation using the sum
of participants’ votes per dataset. The proportion of U.S. assisted liv-
ing centers residents who have Alzheimer’s obtained the fewest votes
across both questions, while the proportion of Americans who believe
long-term abortions should be illegal unilaterally obtained the most.
4.1.3 Impact of Prior Elicitation
It is possible that prior elicitation itself may affect how “Bayesian” a
person appears to be, for example if it encourages the user to be more
sensitive to uncertainty in the data. We include two conditions for
which we do not elicit prior beliefs–No Elicitation-Point Estimate and
No Elicitation-Uncertainty Visualization–and use them to evaluate the
impact of elicitation on deviation from normative Bayesian belief up-
dating. Though individual-level updating with and without elicitation
cannot be directly compared without eliciting the individual’s prior, an
aggregate-level analysis, in which we assign No Elicitation conditions
a common prior learned from many participants, allows us to observe
how elicitation appears to change updating at an aggregate level.
4.2 Experiment Design & Procedure
We ran our experiment as a between-subjects study. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the six elicitation and visualization con-
ditions and one of four datasets (small or large dementia dataset or
small or large abortion data) (Fig. 2). We pre-registered our condi-
tions, sample sizes, and analysis1. An introductory page described the
dementia datasets (originally from the U.S. National Center for Health
Statistics [14]) as having been collected by a national health agency,
and the abortion datasets (originally from FOX News [10]) as having
been collected by a media outlet.
Before we show you the study data, please tell us your best estimate of what 
percentage of assisted-living center residents in the US have Alzheimer's or 
dementia.
Tell us how sure you are about your prediction
Next, consider how uncertain you are about your estimate. Drag either gray end of the 
uncertainty range around the value that you just entered, until the uncertainty it displays 
aligns with how uncertain you are about the true percentage.
If you have no idea whether the estimate you made is more correct than any other 
value between 0 and 100%, the interval should span from 0 to 100%. Otherwise, you 
should adjust the ends of the interval to make it smaller.
You think the percentage is almost certainly no less than 15% and no more than 33% and it's most 
likely around 23%.
Fig. 4. The elicitation interface. First, the participant enters a point es-
timate (top), then they specify how certain they are about their estimate
by dragging either end of the interval (bottom). When the participant
interacts with either handle, the other handle updates to accommodate
the updated Beta distribution.
4.2.1 Prior Belief Elicitation
Participants assigned to elicitation conditions first provided their prior
beliefs (Fig. 4 top). We designed an interface that prompted the
participant to enter their best estimate of the parameter of interest
(e.g., the percentage of assisted-living center residents in the US have
Alzheimer’s or dementia), following prior research in proportion prior
elicitation from experts [64]. A two-handled slider then appeared, rep-
resenting an interval around the value they provided as their estimate,
with endpoints at 0 and 100%. Participants were asked to specify a
range around the value by dragging the end of the interval until its
width aligned with how uncertain they felt about the true rate (Fig. 4
bottom). Participants were explicitly told that if their estimate repre-
sented a truly random guess, then their interval should span from 0 to
100%; otherwise they should adjust the ends of the interval to make
it smaller. When the participant interacted with either handle, we up-
dated the concentration parameter (κ) based on the handle’s value and
the mode, then calculated the other handle’s location to reflect the 95%
interval of the new Beta distribution. Specifically, κ is inversely pro-
portional to the width of the elicited interval. Text above the slider
reflected the specified prior (e.g., You think the percentage is almost
certainly no less than 15% and no more than 33% and it’s most likely
around 23%, Fig. 4c).
4.2.2 Presentation of Observed Data
After prior elicitation, all participants examined the observed data. To
create the visualization stimuli, we used the proportions from the orig-
inal source of the datasets (dementia dataset: 42%, abortion dataset:
37%) and varied the sample size that a participant was assigned (small:
158, large:5208). Participants in the Point Estimate conditions saw the
point estimate of the proportion plotted with the number of successes
and sample size in text only (Fig 5a). Participants in the Uncertainty
Visualization and Bayesian assistance conditions saw the point esti-
mate plotted with an interval depicting the lower and upper bound of
1Pre-registration I, Pre-registration II
(b) Uncertainty visualization only condition
(d) Posterior Visualization
(a) Point Estimate condition
(c) Uncertainty Analogy condition
The study data has 2 times more information than your prior beliefs. In other words, your prior beliefs are 2 times more uncertain than the study 
data. This means you should take the study data 2 times more seriously than your prior beliefs.
How was this calculated?
We directly compared the sample size of the study by the national health agency to the sample size of the study implied by your prior beliefs. Your prior 
beliefs from the previous page implied a study with less participants than those of the study, so the data has 2 times more information than your 
prior beliefs.
This doesn’t mean that your prior beliefs don’t have some useful information. Both your beliefs and the study data suggest information about what the true 
value of the percentage of residents who had Alzheimer's or dementia.
How was this calculated?
We directly compared the sample size of the study by the national health agency to the sample size of the study implied by your prior beliefs. According to 
our computation, the study data has 2 times more information than your prior beliefs, so we weighted the study data 2 times more when we 
merged the two information. 
Fig. 5. Conditions in our experiment, including visualizing observed data as a point estimate with sample size, using a high probability interval
with shading to visualize uncertainty in the observed data only, providing an uncertainty analogy based on the participant’s prior, and providing a
predicted posterior visualization based on the user’s prior.
the corresponding Beta distribution for the Binomial likelihood func-
tion, with shading proportional to probability density (Fig 5b).
4.2.3 Presentation of Bayesian Assistance
After viewing the data and prior visualization, participants in the as-
sistance conditions then clicked for the Bayesian assistance, which ap-
peared below the visualization of the observed data. For participants
in the Analogy condition, we presented an analogy in text (Fig. 5c).
For participants in the Posterior Visualization condition, we presented
a visualization like our uncertainty visualization of the observed data,
but where the distribution shown is the Beta distribution corresponding
to the predicted posterior from our Bayesian model (Fig. 5d).
4.2.4 Posterior Belief Elicitation & Post-Task Questions
All participants then submitted their posterior beliefs on the next
screen. On a final screen, participants were asked demographic ques-
tions (gender, education level, and age), and how likely they thought
it was that the data was manipulated on a five-point Likert scale with
endpoints labeled Not at all likely (1) and Extremely likely (5). The
final screen asked participants what proportion corresponded to the
observed data they had been shown via multiple choice (Below 30%,
between 30% to 60%, above 60%) as a preregistered exclusion criteria
to filter participants who were not paying attention from analysis.
4.2.5 Participants
We recruited participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, removing
those who failed the preregistered exclusion criteria question (total
182), and recruiting more until each condition had 200 participants
(total 4,800). We made the HIT available to U.S. workers with an ap-
proval rating of 97% or more. The HIT carried a reward of $0.8, which
we calculated to ensure that the majority of workers would receive the
U.S. minimum wage according to pilot study completion times.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Data Preliminaries
The average completion task time was 3.6 min (SD: 6.6). To analyze
participants’ responses, we fit the elicited beliefs to a Beta distribu-
tion. We treat the elicited point estimate as the mode of a Beta distri-
bution (ω) and the width of the interval as the concentration param-
eter (κ) to fit a distribution using optimization as suggested by prior
work [64]. To compute each participant’s normative posterior distribu-
tion, we used the relationship between the posterior Beta parameters
and those of the prior and likelihood deriving from Bayes’ rule (Eq. 1).
5.2 Outcome Measures
We treat the deviation between the participant’ actual posterior beliefs
and the normative posterior beliefs as a proxy for how well the par-
ticipant appears to have interpreted the information contained in the
observed data and combined them with their knowledge they already
had. We analyzed the deviation in two ways. First, to provide intu-
ition for how participants updated in terms of the familiar notions of
a distribution’s location and variance, we compared the location (i.e.,
mean) and the variance of each participants’ posterior distribution to
those of the normative posterior distribution.
Second, we pre-registered an analysis using KL Divergence (KLD)
to measure the difference between a participant’s stated posterior be-
liefs and the normative posterior distribution from our Bayesian mod-
els. KLD captures the information loss when representing a target
distribution p with a second distribution q [45].
5.3 Overview of Updating by Location vs. Variance
We analyzed qualitative differences in how participants updated their
beliefs across datasets and visualization conditions.
5.3.1 Location of Updated Belief Distribution by Condition
We categorize participants into five “update types” based on the lo-
cation (i.e., mean) of their posterior distribution relative to their prior
distribution, the normative posterior for that participant, and the likeli-
hood (Fig. 6). We use near normative when the location of the partic-
ipant’s posterior is within a relatively small window of the normative
posterior (i.e., +/- 2%). We use overweight prior for cases where a
participant overweighted their prior distribution relative to the predic-
tions of normative Bayesian updating, and overweight data for cases
where the participant’s posterior fell between the prior and likelihood
but was closer to the likelihood than predicted by normative Bayesian
updating. While most participants’ posterior distributions fell, as we
might expect, somewhere between their prior distribution and the like-
lihood, we use updated away from data for cases where participant’s
posterior moved in an opposite direction from the likelihood as well as
their prior. We use overshoot data for cases where the location of the
participant’s posterior surpassed or “overshot” the observed data.
Figure 6 characterizes participants’ updating behavior by dataset
and visualization condition according to these categories. Overall, the
near normative type was the most frequent across datasets and condi-
tions, suggesting that people are approximating Bayesian updating in
terms of the location of their distributions. Participants in the Point Es-
timate conditions (first column in Fig. 6) were the least likely to fall in
the near normative category, and those in the Posterior Visualization
conditions (last column) were the most likely to.
Overweighting one’s prior was, however, more common in two con-
ditions: the Point Estimate for the large abortion dataset and Uncer-
tainty Visualization for the small abortion dataset. The greater ten-
dency among participants to perceive the abortion dataset as having
been manipulated may have led participants to adhere more strongly
to their prior beliefs.
Similarly, when comparing the ratio of the overweight prior type
between dementia datasets (row a and b) and abortion dataset (row c
and d), more participants overweighted their priors when they exam-
ined abortion datasets.
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Fig. 6. Categorization of the location and variance of participants’ updates relative to the predictions of normative Bayesian inference for that
participant. Top: Each participant was categorized according to the relationship between the mean of their posterior distribution relative to that of
their prior distribution, the normative posterior distribution, and the likelihood function. The legend shows a hypothetical participant for which the
mean of their prior distribution was smaller than that of the likelihood; our analysis also includes the opposite case (i.e., the mean of the participant’s
prior was greater than the mean of the likelihood). Bottom: Each participant was categorized according to the relationship between the variance of
their posterior distribution relative to that of the normative posterior distribution.
Figure 6 also indicates that the analogy conditions resulted in the
highest ratio of people who overshot the likelihood across datasets.
The vast majority (roughly 95%) of our participants had more uncer-
tain priors compared to the likelihood, leading to multipliers greater
than one. It is possible that imprecise mental calculations led analogy
participants to overcorrect.
5.3.2 Variance in Updated Beliefs by Condition
To contextualize how the amount of uncertainty implied by partici-
pants’ posterior beliefs compared to the amount predicted by norma-
tive inference, we categorized patterns in variance updates (Fig. 6).
Because the deviation in elicited posterior versus normative posterior
variance was considerably larger than that for means, we categorized
participants as close to normative if the participant’s posterior was
within 10% of the variance of the normative posterior. We similarly
categorized participants whose posterior variance was more than 50%
smaller than the variance of the normative posterior, as well as 10-50%
smaller, 10-50% larger, or more than 50% larger.
Comparing the distribution across categories in Figure 6 Location
(top) to that in Figure 6 Variance (bottom), it is clear that partic-
ipants’ deviations from normative inference are driven primarily by
non-Bayesian updating of the variance of their beliefs. Additionally,
in contrast to the results on location updating, we see no clear ad-
vantages of the two types of Bayesian assistance in reducing errors in
variance updating. Regardless of the specific dataset, most participants
provided posterior beliefs the variance of which was 10%-50% higher
than the variance of the normative posterior. Hence, participants re-
mained more uncertain about the parameter value than they should
have in general. Possible drivers of this pattern include unmodeled
predictors (e.g., a person’s relative trust in data relative to a Bayesian),
error in elicitation, or non-Bayesian updating.
Variance results are somewhat different between the small (row a
and c) and large datasets (row b and d). Specifically, around 30%
of participants who saw small datasets were more certain than the
normative posterior (summing up the first two bars). However, for
those who saw large datasets, this number dropped to less than 17%
of participants. Overall, participants were less certain of their up-
dated beliefs than the normative posterior, but those who saw the small
datasets were overconfident more frequently than those who saw the
large datasets.
5.4 Preregistered Models: Updating by Log KLD
Per our pre-registration, we specified four Bayesian linear regressions,
one for each dataset we presented to participants (dementia N=158,
dementia N=5208, abortion N=158, abortion N=5208). These regres-
sions estimate differences in the distributions of KLD, a singular mea-
sure of deviation between each participant’s updating and normative
Bayesian updating, by condition.
kld ∼ dlnorm(µ,σ)
µ = µint +µpost ∗Post
+ µanlg ∗Analogy+µpointEst ∗PointEst
log(σ) = σint +σpost ∗Post
+ σanlg ∗Analogy+σpointEst ∗PointEst
µint ,µpost ,µanlg,µpointEst ∼ dnorm(0,5),
σint ,σpost ,σanlg,σpointEst ∼ dnorm(0,2.5)
Each model consisted of two submodels. The first submodel pre-
dicted bias (mean error) in log KLD, capturing how closely partic-
ipants’ response distributions aligned with the normative Bayesian
prediction by condition. We use log KLD in our analysis (reporting
non-log error results in Supplemental Material) to reduce the impacts
of outliers we observed across conditions on our estimates, as KLD
grows rapidly as the two distributions diverge more.
Fig. 7. Posterior estimates of bias (mean error) and dispersion (standard
deviation) of log KLD with 95% credible interval by condition. Results for
the dementia datasets are presented in the top row, and for the abor-
tion datasets in the bottom row. Annotations describe effects relative to
visualizing uncertainty in observed data (Uncertainty Vis).
The second submodel regressed dispersion (variance) in log KLD
in log space on the same variables, capturing how much variation there
was between participants’ deviations from normative inference in a
condition. In addition to lower bias, lower dispersion (i.e., more con-
sistent) estimates of log KLD means a technique reduces noise.
We implemented each model in R’s rethinking package [48], using
weakly-informed Gaussian prior distributions centered around 0 for
bias and dispersion. We used dummy variables to indicate whether the
participant was shown an uncertainty visualization, an analogy, or a
posterior visualization.
We report the result for each condition and dataset relative to a par-
ticipant in the Uncertainty Visualization condition, as visualizing un-
certainty is arguably the best choice a designer could make outside
of personalization. We provide coefficients for both submodels in Fig-
ure 7, left. For readers familiar with statistical significance, we say that
a condition has a reliable effect over uncertainty visualization when its
95% Percentile Interval (PI) (reported in text) does not overlap with 0
(which would indicate the possibility of no effect). We visualize poste-
rior estimates of expected bias and dispersion in log KLD by condition
(Fig. 7, right). Model specifications are in Supplemental Material.
To further contextualize the size of the effects in bias and disper-
sion, we also report Cohen’s d [19] and Common Language Effect Size
(CLES [50]), measures of standardized effect size, using our model re-
sults. Cohen’s d captures the number of standard deviations by which
two means differ, while CLES describes what percentage of the time a
randomly drawn sample from one distribution would have a higher
value than a randomly drawn sample from the second distribution.
To calculate effect size on our model estimates, we first constructed
an aggregated posterior distribution for each condition, using the bias
posterior estimates from the bias submodel and dispersion posterior
estimates from the dispersion model. We compute effect size by com-
paring the distribution of the assistance conditions with that of the Un-
certainty Visualization condition.
5.4.1 Dementia Dataset
Small sample (N=158): Relative to the Uncertainty Visualization con-
dition, both Bayesian assistance techniques reliably decreased bias in
log KLD by similar amounts (-0.19, -0.17 respectively; Fig 7a). View-
ing a Point Estimate was not distinguishable in log KLD compared to
viewing an Uncertainty Visualization.
Our characterization of updating by location and variance (Sec. 5.3)
suggested that the Posterior Visualization helped participants correctly
update the location of their beliefs. Hence, the bias reduction in log
KLD may be driven by better location updating among Posterior Visu-
alization participants. On the other hand, our earlier analysis (Fig. 6)
indicates that the location updating of participants in the Analogy con-
dition and the Uncertainty Visualization condition for the small de-
mentia dataset are similar. Hence the reliable improvement in updating
we observe for the Analogy condition may be driven more by better
variance updates than better location updating.
Our dispersion submodel indicates that the Posterior Visualization
led to more consistent values of log KLD among participants com-
pared to Uncertainty Visualization, with an estimated reduction in dis-
persion of 0.39 (Fig 7e). Seeing an Analogy did not noticeably af-
fect dispersion compared to the Uncertainty Visualization. However,
viewing a Point Estimate increased dispersion in log KLD relative to
Uncertainty Visualization.
Cohen’s d for the Posterior Visualization was 0.33, equivalent to a
CLES of 59%. Hence, a participant from Posterior Visualization con-
ditions will have lower log KLD than a participant from the Uncer-
tainty Visualization condition 59 out of 100 times when we randomly
select a participant from each condition. Cohen’s d for the Analogy
assistance was 0.27, equivalent to a CLES 57%.
Large sample (N=5208): Relative to the Uncertainty Visualization
condition, viewing a Posterior Visualization reliably reduced bias in
log KLD, but viewing an Analogy or Point Estimate had no observable
effect (Fig. 7b).
While highly variant, the distribution of bias in log KLD for the
Posterior Visualization condition does not overlap with the distribu-
tions of expected bias for the non-Bayesian conditions (Fig. 7b right).
However, the distribution of expected bias for the Analogy condition
is not distinguishable from the Point Estimate and Uncertainty Visual-
ization conditions. Again, our earlier analysis of location and variance
updates (Fig. 6) suggests that participants in the Posterior Visualiza-
tion conditions were better at updating the location of their posterior.
All conditions reliably increased dispersion in log KLD relative to
Uncertainty Visualization (Fig. 7f)
Cohen’s d for the Posterior Visualization was 0.21, equivalent to a
CLES of 56%.
5.4.2 Abortion Dataset
Small sample (N=158): Similar to the small dementia dataset, the
Analogy and Posterior Visualization both reliably reduced bias in log
KLD relative to the Uncertainty Visualization (Fig. 7c) while the Point
Estimate condition was not reliably different.
Compared to the small sample dementia dataset, being in the Pos-
terior visualization condition resulted in higher estimated dispersion
in log KLD (Fig. 7g).
Cohen’s d for the Analogy and Posterior Visualization were 0.35
(CLES 59%).
Large sample (N=5208): In contrast to the large dementia dataset,
neither the Posterior Visualization nor the Analogy condition reliably
reduced bias in log KLD for the large abortion dataset (Fig. 7d). A
Point Estimate also did not reliably differ from Uncertainty Visual-
ization. We suspect that any effects of Bayesian assistance were too
small to observe in light of the rather large discrepancies we observed
between participants’ posterior beliefs and the predictions of norma-
tive Bayesian inference with regard to variance (Fig. 6).
We see slightly different patterns compared to the large sample de-
mentia dataset when it comes to effects on dispersion in log KLD.
Viewing an Analogy slightly decreased dispersion in log KLD while
viewing a Point Estimate had a stronger decreasing effect (Fig. 7h).
5.5 Conceptual Replication of Sample Size Effect
Our results conceptually replicate a difference in how closely the
updates of untrained participants resemble Bayesian updating when
shown a small versus a large dataset observed in behavioral eco-
nomics [2, 12] and visual data interpretation [43]. While participants
assigned large datasets appear to update closer to normative Bayesian
inference when we look at location of posterior beliefs (e.g., com-
pare row a and b, and row c and d in Fig 6), the opposite is true
when we look at the variance of their posterior beliefs, where devi-
ation from normative Bayesian inference is substantial. The average
bias in log KLD across participants was 0.90 (median:0.93, IQR:0.23,
KLD: 11.24) for small datasets, and much higher for large datasets
(mean: 1.67, median:1.68, IQR:0.04, KLD: 49.7), similar to Kim et
al.’s [43] observations for a small sample (n=158) and much larger
(n=750k) sample.
Conceptual models of bias like belief in the law of small num-
bers [63] attempt to explain diverse experimental evidence on belief
updating. Our results and those of Kim et al. [43] are congruent with
a model of non-belief in the law of large numbers [12] suggesting that
while a Bayesian expects a estimate to eventually converge to the true
rate, people update their beliefs as though they expect error in the es-
timate to be relatively high and constant as sample size increases.
-0.8
-0.1
Elicitation
No elicitation
Dementia 
(N=158)
Dementia 
(N=5208)
Abortion 
(N=158)
Abortion 
(N=5208)
-1.0
-0.1 -0.1
0.3
-0.3
0.1
Fig. 8. Comparing whether users from whom we elicited priors updated
closer to Bayesian in aggregate than those who did not provide pri-
ors. Elicitation conditions yielded lower log KLD, implying prior elicitation
alone may improve updating.
5.6 Effect of Prior Elicitation
Our results show that conditional on a user specifying their prior, Pos-
terior Visualization and sometimes Uncertainty Analogy better pro-
mote Bayesian updating than simply visualizing uncertainty in the ob-
served data. However, given that the status quo in most interactive
visualization is not to elicit a prior, one might ask how the act of prior
elicitation itself impacts updating. Do users become more sensitive to
uncertainty in observed data when they explicitly consider their sub-
jective uncertainty about a parameter value?
Comparing an individual’s posterior beliefs to a normative Bayesian
posterior with and without elicitation is not possible, as without a prior
we would have no way of computing the normative posterior. We in-
stead use an aggregate analysis approach similar to that used in prior
work on Bayesian cognition [34, 43] and to our approach to computing
effect size using CLES (full details reported in Supplemental Mate-
rial). Across the board, elicitation conditions yielded lower log KLD,
suggesting prior elicitation alone may improve updating (Fig. 8).
6 BAYESIAN COGNITION AS VISUALIZATION FRAMEWORK
We reflect on the potential for using Bayesian assistance and Bayesian
modeling to improve visualization.
6.1 Bayesian Assistance as Design Strategy
Our work adds to growing evidence that a Bayesian cognition ap-
proach can deepen insight into belief formation from visualization and
give rise to new design and evaluation techniques for visualization re-
search and practice.
Our results first provide evidence of tendencies in how untrained
users form beliefs from data. Comparing our analysis of location
updates to that of variance updates as a whole (Sec. 5.3), it is clear
that people are much better at providing posterior beliefs that are lo-
cated (i.e., have a mean that is) approximately near the location of the
normative Bayesian posterior beliefs than they are at providing poste-
rior beliefs that are appropriately certain. Specifically, study partici-
pants remained considerably less certain that the information-pooling
Bayesian would do, aligning with recent empirically-based models of
belief updating from behavioral economics [12] as well as the large
sample results of Kim et al. [43].
When visualizations present estimates based on small samples for
inference, generating Bayesian assistance from users’ priors in the
context of a simple Bayesian model can improve untrained users sensi-
tivity to how informative new data are. Compared to visualizing uncer-
tainty in an estimate, Bayesian assistance resulted in a small to moder-
ate reduction in bias in updating for estimates based on small samples,
even when data were perceived as moderately likely to have been ma-
nipulated. When the Bayesian assistance techniques were compared to
point estimates, which remain the default approach to presenting esti-
mates in many venues [36], the Bayesian assistance techniques were
slightly more effective (CLES from 55% to 61%). Using prior beliefs
as an entry point into communicating uncertainty via Bayesian assis-
tance may therefore be helpful in common small sample scenarios like
presentations of poll results, where people’s misinterpretations of un-
certainty in data often have implications for their decisions. It can also
reduce heterogeneity in updating behavior, especially if the alternative
presentation is a point estimate with sample size.
The benefits of Bayesian assistance for large sample scenarios
are less clear-cut. For the dementia dataset, visualizing a predicted
Bayesian posterior better aligned participants’ posterior beliefs on av-
erage with Bayesian inference. This effect, similar to the effects of
posterior visualization that we observed for small samples, appears to
be driven mostly by the Bayesian assistance helping people more ac-
curately update the location of their beliefs. We note, however, that the
effect of posterior visualization for the large dementia dataset may be
too small to be of practical significance, as in a large data case KLD
can be sensitive (e.g., even if two highly concentrated distributions are
quite close in location, KLD can yield a high value.
The Analogy condition did not reliably improve inference for the
large dementia dataset. It is possible that people struggled to use large
multipliers to arrive at the normative posterior implied by the analogy,
as larger numbers are associated with less precise mental representa-
tions and more error in mental calculation [23].
For the large abortion dataset, which participants rated as slightly
more likely to be subject to manipulation, neither of Bayesian assis-
tance techniques improved inferences. This may be due to participants
discounting the informativeness of the data based on their perceptions
that it might have been manipulated. We present an analysis in Sup-
plemental Material that provides partial support for this explanation.
6.2 Prior Elicitation as Beneficial
The benefits of eliciting data-oriented predictions from visualization
users have been demonstrated in prior work by Kim, Hullman, and col-
leagues [41, 42, 37]. Our work extends these findings using a formal
Bayesian evaluative framework. One possible explanation, congru-
ent with the findings that eliciting probabilistic predictions improves
uncertainty comprehension of Hullman et al. [37], is that interacting
with the prior elicitation interface better prepared participants to rea-
son about uncertainty in the observed data. Researchers and authors
who want to engage visualization users to think more deeply about
estimates should consider eliciting subjective uncertainty as an alter-
native or complement to visualizing uncertainty in estimates.
6.3 Using Bayesian Inference as Visualization Framework
Given the potential utility of Bayesian models of cognition to visu-
alization, as demonstrated by our work and prior work [43, 65], it is
worth considering the importance of assumptions of these models and
the design requirements of using such approaches.
6.3.1 Are the Assumptions of Bayesian Cognition Valid?
Using Bayesian models of cognition in visualization assumes that
users have prior beliefs, they can articulate them when guided to do
so, and that greater alignment between how they update their beliefs
and how a Bayesian would is desirable (Sec. 3.1). A common question
might be, can I trust the prior beliefs that a participant provides? We
refer the reader to literature in economics and psychology for detailed
evidence suggesting that people can provide priors unincentivized, and
that elicited or inferred representations of people’s prior beliefs has
predictive value for their later behavior (Sec. 2.1).
When it comes to applications of Bayesian cognition to visualiza-
tion design and evaluation, even though it is reasonable to believe
that elicited priors are not a perfect representation of a user’s prior
beliefs, we find evidence that they can still be useful to consider in
interaction. Prior elicitation itself may be beneficial for prompting
a more uncertainty-aware mindset on the part of a visualization user.
Moreover, when multiple belief updates by the same person can be ob-
served, as might be the case in visual analytics scenarios, a Bayesian
framework can enable detecting patterns of irrational movement or un-
certainty reduction in beliefs even if users are far from the predicted
Bayesian posterior, due to noise in eliciting prior beliefs or approxi-
mate Bayesian behavior [6]. For example, regardless of the distance
between their posterior beliefs and normative Bayesian posterior be-
liefs, if a person increasingly shifts their beliefs without becoming
more certain over time, or becomes much more certain without any
shifts in beliefs, it is relatively obvious that their belief formation is not
responding appropriately to data. It may be worth exploring how prior
elicitation could be avoided while still gaining the benefit of Bayesian
models for bias detection in visual analytics settings where its reason-
able to infer a prior based on data that the system has observed the
analyst examining in the past.
By explicitly suggesting to a user how they should update their be-
liefs in light of new data, Bayesian assistance poses interesting ques-
tions about when Bayesian inference is the most appropriate normative
standard. For example, under what conditions should a user who is
distrustful of a data source be guided to integrate the new information
into their prior beliefs? While this question is beyond the scope of our
work, we believe that there are a number of cases where valid data is
rejected irrationally by users, such as when distrust in the source of a
media report (e.g., a Conservative leaning publication) leads a Demo-
crat to reject new information that is in fact trustworthy.
In cases where a simple Bayesian model that assumes a user takes
data at “face value” seems clearly inappropriate, such as when a data
source is well known to not be trustworthy, Bayesian modeling can
help visualization researchers arrive at a more precise understanding of
influences external to the data. Factors that shape data reception, like
the influence of one’s a priori trust in the data source, the interaction
between the specific parameter estimate and one’s beliefs about the
source [7, 15], the tendency to reject one’s beliefs entirely upon realiz-
ing one was misinformed, or the tendency for people to diverge from
a Bayesian’s tendency to form posterior beliefs with less variance than
their prior or the likelihood even cases where the prior and likelihood
would seem disparate are all fair game for including in more sophisti-
cated Bayesian models in the form of “hyperpriors” (distributions over
parameters of the priors). We believe such “pseudo-Bayesian” mod-
els could provide the basis for understanding a large class of cognitive
biases that affect judgments from visualizations.
6.3.2 Generalization of Bayesian Approach
How to use Bayesian cognition for understanding or improving be-
lief updating from visualizations may at first seem complicated. We
suggest that a natural starting place to apply the approach involves
first determining what parameter(s) a visualization supports estimat-
ing. The parameter(s) should correspond to statistics on the observed
data that the author believes are most important to the user and infer-
ence task: a population-level proportion (rate), a bivariate relationship
(with parameters, e.g., of a slope and intercept), an average.
A Bayesian model can be specified to estimate the posterior prob-
ability of the parameter(s) given a prior distribution and likelihood
function assumed to characterize data generation. As our experiment
demonstrates, even a simple model may suffice to drive improved in-
ferences. While Bayesian modeling is flexible to varying forms of
prior and posterior distributions, model specification is often simpli-
fied by looking to a family of distributions associated with a type of
parameter and likelihood to identify the conjugate prior (e.g., a Beta
distribution for probability, a truncated Gaussian for a positive-valued
random variable, a Gamma for a duration, etc.). Textbooks aimed at
readers new to Bayesian modeling provide accessible explanations and
examples of common model formats [44, 49] The Bayesian model we
employed for a Binominal likelihood function to generate Bayesian
assistance has just a single parameter. However, the general intu-
ition behind Bayesian assistance applies to other data generating pro-
cesses like Gaussians, where the mean of the normative posterior is the
weighted average between the mean of the prior and the observed data
weighted by the amount of information in each distribution. More
detail on how to calculate posterior parameters when the likelihood
function follows other distributions (e.g., Normal distribution) is in
Supplemental Material.
We believe that the potential for Bayesian assistance to be used as
a design strategy in visualization analysis and communication settings
extends far beyond the demonstration we presented here. For exam-
ple, while we use an individual’s prior from a single belief update to
drive the two forms of Bayesian assistance, recent work from eco-
nomics suggests that how a person updates their beliefs in light of new
data is a stable individual trait [5, 6, 24, 52]. Personalizing data rep-
resentations based on an individual’s “update type” (e.g., tendency to
overweight vs. underweight their prior or data) may be beneficial in
visual analytics or communication settings.
7 CONCLUSION
We showed how personalizing the presentation of visualized data us-
ing Bayesian inference can assist untrained visualizations users in up-
dating their beliefs more like Bayesians. Through a large experiment
(N=4,800), we found that presenting a Uncertainty Analogy or Pos-
terior Visualization improved belief updating for proportion estimates
compared to typical presentations of uncertainty for small datasets,
and, in some cases, for large datasets for which people tend to deviate
more from normative inference. By comparing to visualizing uncer-
tainty in the data via a shaded interval, we show that better responsive
to new information captured by data may require more sophisticated,
theoretically-driven approaches like Bayesian cognition. Further, an
aggregate level analysis of updating suggested that prior elicitation
alone may improve Bayesian reasoning. Our Bayesian framework can
be applied to gain insight into belief formation, better define “norma-
tive” consumption of data visualizations, and guide interactions with
data in a range of contexts.
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